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PROBLEM OF EASTERN POLAND TESTS MOSCOW-TEHERAN ACCORDS

NOW that the Russians, at the turn of the New Year, have crossed the old Russo-Polish border, the problem of Eastern Poland assumes immediate urgency. This problem is not only a test of the newly developed collaboration between Britain, Russia and the United States, who at Teheran, proclaimed their intention to assure the rights of small nations. It also promises to have important repercussions in this country, where the presence of a large population of Polish origin could easily transform an issue of foreign policy into a domestic controversy.

AN ANCIENT DISPUTE. The problem of Eastern Poland is not new. Since the formation of the Polish state in the tenth century, relations between Russia and Poland have been dominated by a struggle for the borderlands of White Russia and the Ukraine, which both countries have claimed at various times—Poland on historic grounds, Russia on grounds of ethnography and strategic security. Following protracted wars with Russia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Poland underwent three partitions—in 1772, 1793 and 1795—during which it was divided between Austria, Prussia and Russia. As a result of these partitions, Russia obtained for the most part lands which were ethnically non-Polish, although they had been included, for varying periods, in the Polish state. It was only at the close of the Napoleonic wars that Russia acquired purely Polish areas.

Following the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, the Russian-controlled segment of Poland was reunited with the restored Polish state. At that time, when Russia was torn by revolution and civil war, Marshal Pilsudski sought to expand the country's boundaries as far eastward as possible. In 1919 Polish forces overran Eastern Galicia; Vilna, just awarded to Lithuania by the Allies, was seized by the Poles; and in April 1920 Pilsudski attacked Russia, with the avowed aim of including Lithuania, White Russia,

and the Ukraine in an enlarged Polish-Lithuanian state. The Russians drove the Poles out of the Ukraine, but under the Russo-Polish treaty of Riga concluded in 1921 Poland retained extensive Ukrainian and White Russian territories.

RIBBENTROP-MOLOTOV LINE. In subsequent years the anti-Russian and anti-Communist policy of Polish leaders like Pilsudski and Colonel Beck, patriotic though it doubtless seemed to many Poles, was regarded by Russia as a threat to its security—all the more so when, in 1934, Colonel Beck adopted a course of "appeasement" toward Hitler. In all fairness, it should be said that Poland was not in a position to challenge Nazi Germany, nor was its government the only one in the world that sought to appease the Nazis. In fact, the Russians did just that when, on the eve of Germany's invasion of Poland, they concluded a nonaggression pact with Hitler. The possibility, however, that Poland might become a base for German attack on Russia colored Moscow's attitude toward the Polish government.

Under the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement of 1939 Russia obtained Eastern Poland. In this area the Poles constitute not a majority, but the largest minority (it is estimated that there are, in Eastern Poland, 5 million Poles, over 4 million Ukrainians, and over a million White Russians). That same year Polish White Russia was incorporated into the White Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, while Polish Ukraine was incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Since that time—although Eastern Poland, following the German invasion of Russia, has been occupied by German forces—the Russians have claimed that all inhabitants of these areas of Poland deported to Russia are legally citizens of the U.S.S.R., not citizens of Poland, as claimed by the Polish government in London.

Through the efforts of the late Premier Sikorski, who immediately after the German invasion of Rus-

sia adopted a policy of letting bygones be bygones, a basis was laid down for collaboration between the Polish government and the Kremlin. By the Russian-Polish treaty of July 30, 1941 the U.S.S.R. recognized "the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity." It might have been assumed that Russian arrangements flowing from these treaties, notably the incorporation of Polish White Russia and Polish Ukraine into the U.S.S.R., would have been equally invalidated, but the Soviet government has made no statement to that effect. On the contrary, it has consistently given the impression that there can be no discussion about the disposal of Eastern Poland, and that its acceptance of the terms of the Atlantic Charter after the German invasion of 1941 in no way affects any measures it may have taken before that time.

It is dangerous to make dogmatic assertions about a controversy so hoary with ancient grudges and prejudices. There are a few points, however, that can be stated with some degree of certainty. These may be listed as follows:

1. Neither Britain nor the United States will go to war with Russia to recover Eastern Poland for the Polish state.

2. Public opinion in Britain and the United States will suffer disillusionment if the Soviet government, after a quarter of a century of opposing "imperialism" and "territorial annexations," now insists on unilateral seizure of Eastern Poland, especially after having agreed that its 1939 treaties with Nazi Germany had lost their validity.

3. Borders are not merely a matter of strategy or ethnography. They are also a matter of sentiment. The Polish government in London, headed by the Peasant party leader Stanislaw Mikolajczyk as Prime Minister and the trade union Socialist leader Jan Kwapiński as Deputy Prime Minister and Min-

ister of Reconstruction, apparently feels just as concerned about the retention of Eastern Poland within the Polish state as Polish conservatives.

4. No statesman, no matter how omniscient, would be able to fix a boundary satisfactory to both Russia and Poland in an area where populations have intermingled for centuries.

5. Russia does not need Eastern Poland either for additional territory, resources or population. It claims the area chiefly on the grounds of security.

6. Security will not be achieved by mere seizure of territory. On the contrary, the efforts of Britain, the United States and Russia, through the Moscow accord and the Teheran declaration, to create a feeling of security on the part of small nations, may be defeated if the first move made toward the liberation of conquered peoples in Europe is the extension of Russian territory at the expense of a smaller nation.

All these considerations would suggest that the only hopeful approach to this border problem, the most baffling in Eastern Europe, is neither automatic seizure of the territory by Russia nor its automatic return to Poland, but an attempt to apply, in this first test case, some of the principles adumbrated at Moscow and Teheran. It is impossible at this time to arrange for an internationally supervised plebiscite in Eastern Poland. But it would be desirable if Russia invited Britain and the United States to participate with it in an Allied commission to examine this particular problem, just as Britain and the United States invited Russia to sit on the commission on Mediterranean affairs. Should the U.S.S.R. agree to such a procedure, it would give the best possible indication that it regards United Nations collaboration not as one-way traffic but as a genuine attempt to achieve security for all nations, large and small.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

PEOPLE—NOT EMPEROR—HOLD KEY TO PEACEFUL JAPAN

A new note in American policy toward Japan has been struck by our former Ambassador in Tokyo. Speaking in Chicago on December 29, Mr. Joseph C. Grew—now a special assistant to Secretary Hull—declared that, after decisively defeating Japan, the United Nations should "offer the Japanese people hope for the future." The proper attitude, he said, would be to adopt "a helpful, cooperative, common sense spirit, devoid of browbeating or vindictiveness, with emphasis laid upon what the Japanese would have to gain by playing the game with the rest of the world."

This is a valuable contribution to healthy discussion of Japan's future. For the closer we come to destroying Japan's military power and aggressive plans, the more necessary it will be to have a policy that can give our arms genuine support in establishing and

keeping the peace in Asia. The prevalent feeling in the United States that the Japanese are a nation of savages is due to a combination of the shock suffered at Pearl Harbor, underhanded Japanese tactics in the South Pacific, racial prejudice, and ignorance of Japan. A policy compounded of these elements cannot lead to a sound future for the Far East. Unquestionably we will not leave any stone unturned to prevent Japan from waging war again, but this in itself means that we must encourage every future tendency on the part of the Japanese people to look for a new non-militaristic way of life.

WHAT OF THE EMPEROR? Mr. Grew is on firm ground here, but his suggestion that Japanese emperor-worship may be a force for keeping the peace, if the emperor is "a peace-seeking ruler not controlled by the military," is open to argument. It

may be asked whether he was expressing more than his personal views, even though he emphasized that on this point he was speaking for himself and not for the government. Several facts suggest a trend in policy-making circles toward absolving the Emperor of blame for Japan's militaristic policies, thereby intimating that we may later be able to "do business" with him.

As far back as December 9, 1942 Elmer Davis, Director of the Office of War Information, declared that Emperor Hirohito had "no more say about Japan than I have." A year later the State Department included in a collection of documents on American-Japanese relations a memorandum of October 25, 1941 sent by Ambassador Grew from Tokyo. According to this report, which was based on the assertions of a Japanese informant, the Emperor had personally ordered Army and Navy representatives to follow a policy guaranteeing that there would be no war with the United States. It is significant that, in the words of the preface, this collection is not complete, but contains "only reports of special significance." Not unnaturally, newspapermen at once drew the memorandum to the public's attention and suggested that the Emperor's alleged desire for peace might ultimately help him to keep his throne.

It is difficult to see why the United States at this moment has any need to take a stand on the Emperor's future, openly or by implication. Not only do we know very little about the current political situation in Japan, but we are far from having defeated the Japanese. And we have surely had abundant evidence that, if the Emperor actually desired to avoid war with the United States, he was singularly unsuccessful in his efforts. Moreover, emperor-worship and the prestige of the imperial household remain powerful weapons in the propaganda arsenal of the Japanese Army and Navy. The use to which they are being put at present is suggested by the Em-

peror's rescript, read at the opening of the Japanese Diet on December 26. He stated on that occasion that "the people, all with the same spirit, must crush the inordinate ambition of the enemy nations with all the nation's total efforts."

THE JAPANESE PEOPLE AND PEACE. Possibly, in a late stage of the war when Japan's position is hopeless, the Emperor will become the rallying point of groups seeking peace. It is equally possible—since here we are in the realm of pure speculation—that, as the Japanese people realize the enormity of the crisis that faces them, they will turn not only against the militarists, but against the Emperor himself as a tool of the armed forces. Since there is no way of testing these alternatives at present, it would seem to be just as unwise for us to intimate that we seek his survival as to pledge his downfall. Our task now is to prosecute the war against Japan with the utmost vigor. And, as Japan is driven toward defeat, we will want to observe internal developments closely, although maintaining a cautious attitude toward all leaders who claim to have become anti-militaristic. Only when a crack-up finally comes will we be in a position, on the basis of our own views and Japanese conditions, to determine in detail our attitude toward Japan's political institutions.

But one thing can be said now. To place our hopes in the Emperor as an instrument of peace and stability does not bring us to grips with the problems of a defeated Japan. If anything is clear, it is that the Emperor cannot serve the cause of peace unless a significant section of the Japanese population is peaceminded and has some means of expressing its desires. If the militarists have had their way so far and have used the Emperor at will, is this not in part the result of rigid regimentation imposed on the Japanese people? In preventing a resurgence of militarism, a genuine popular voice in government is needed. We cannot rely on the inclinations of a "peaceful" emperor or "moderate" statesmen to keep Japan on a sound course.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

NEW RESEARCH STAFF MEMBER

The Association announces with pleasure the appointment to the Research Department of Grant S. McClellan. Mr. McClellan received his B.A. at the University of Nebraska and his M.A. at the London School of Economics. He has been on the staff of the National Research Council, the Office of Strategic Services and the Office of Censorship, and has an honorable discharge from the Air Corps Administration of the United States Army.

JUST PUBLISHED: *a summary of the deliberations of the UNRRA Council at its first session, and six of the most important resolutions adopted at the meeting.*

UNRRA — A STEP TOWARD RECONSTRUCTION by Vera Micheles Dean

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
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Washington News Letter



JAN. 3.—The British and United States governments have for some time been subjected to unremitting public pressure to relax the blockade of the European continent and permit relief food to be sent into German-occupied countries. Isolationist organs like the *New York Daily News* have attacked Prime Minister Churchill for not permitting food to pass through the blockade, although he shares this responsibility with other British, as well as American, officials. Several of the Allied governments in London have urged Britain and the United States to permit the sending of food into the countries they represent.

The United States and Britain, however, have refused to breach the blockade, with two exceptions: a feeding program for unoccupied France, which was suspended when Washington and Vichy terminated diplomatic relations following our invasion of North Africa in 1942; and a program for Greece, which remains in operation. Now advocates of shipping food through the blockade have gained new strength, as a result of the approval given on December 20 by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to a resolution sponsored by Senator Gillette of Iowa. This resolution declares it is the sentiment of the Senate that food be sent by the Allies to children, nursing mothers, and expectant mothers in occupied Europe.

FEEDING THROUGH BLOCKADE. The controversy over this poignant issue is not between good people who wish to feed the starving, and bad people who say "Let them starve." It is a controversy between those who believe that food sent through the blockade would reach the mothers and children it is destined for, and skeptics who contend that the Germans would use the food for their own advantage. Emotion naturally colors this debate, for men and women everywhere find it hard to contemplate starvation with equanimity, although the extent of actual starvation in Europe is difficult to measure.

Right now the Germans are taking advantage of the Geneva prisoners-of-war convention which requires a belligerent government to feed the military prisoners in its control. The Nazis in many instances have withdrawn their contributions of rations to those who receive the "supplemental food" packages sent regularly from the United States and Britain. When in 1941 Herbert Hoover, who supports the "feed-Europe-now" campaign, sought German approval for a Belgian food relief program, the Nazis were willing to authorize the control commission to operate in Brussels only; the British government then

turned down the Hoover proposal. The Greek program, under a Swiss-Swedish commission with International Red Cross cooperation, works pretty well because its members and agents are permitted to travel all over the country and check on every move in the distribution of the food. Greece, moreover, unlike the countries of Western Europe, has few foodstuffs needed by the Germans. The authors of the Gillette Resolution recognize the possibility that Germany may be aided through relief programs, for the resolution urges "rigid safeguarding of such relief so that no military advantage whatever may accrue to the civil populations or armed forces of the invading nations."

The blockade is a weapon that accomplishes more in this "total war" toward harming Germany—dependent as it is on raw materials it normally imports from all over the world—than in any previous conflict. It is not a new weapon. Notwithstanding the blockade's importance, the United States and Britain have indicated willingness to lift it for the shipment of food to the occupied countries provided the following conditions are met.

POSSIBLE CONDITIONS. (1) The relief program be limited to special recipients excluding adults working or capable of work. (2) Operation of the program to be under the complete control of a neutral commission whose personnel must be approved by the American and British governments. The commission must be permitted to maintain an adequate staff and must have complete freedom of movement within the given country in order to supervise all aspects of the plan's operation. (3) Germany must not purchase or requisition any food within, or ship any food from, the country in which such a program is instituted, except where surpluses of particular foods exist that cannot be consumed by the local population. (4) All arrangements which may be negotiated by the supervising commission for the barter of locally produced commodities against foodstuffs or other relief goods from German stocks will be subject to review and approval in advance by the British and American governments. (4) Germany must continue to supply any foods now being supplied to the given country in the same quantities (based on nutritive value) as at present. (6) All shipping required for the operation of the scheme must be by neutral vessels, at present unused, from within the blockade area. (Sweden has indicated readiness to place its ships in such service.)

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